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Abstract
In February 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea handed down its Advisory Opinion in Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring 
Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area. Although primarily focused on governance 
of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction (‘the Area’), the Opinion has wider relevance for 
both international environmental law and general international law. More speciﬁcally, although 
sustainable development is not directly referenced in the Opinion, this article argues that it goes a 
long way towards strengthening many of the emerging normative rules associated with it. Using 
the International Law Association’s 2002 New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International 
Law relating to Sustainable Development as a framework, this article speciﬁcally analyses the 
Advisory Opinion’s contribution to the sustainable use of natural resources, the precautionary 
approach, common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities, and the principle of good governance.
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Introduction
On 1 February 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) handed down its Advisory Opinion in 
* Also co-rapporteur of the International Law Association Committee on International Law on 
Sustainable Development. Many thanks to the participants in the workshop on “Sustainable 
Development Principles in the Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals” held at the Inter-
national Development Law Organization (IDLO), Rome (June 2011), where an original version 
of this article was presented. With thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their comments.
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Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with 
respect to Activities in the Area.1 This Opinion is noteworthy in several respects. 
It was the ﬁrst judicial act of the Chamber, the Opinion was adopted by una-
nimity, and it highlights the increased trend towards signiﬁcant exploration of 
the deep seabed, which in time will undoubtedly transform into exploitation 
of its natural resources. But arguably more signiﬁcant than any of this, is the 
content of the Advisory Opinion itself, which sets out, in a coherent, forward-
looking manner, the responsibilities of States when they sponsor activities in 
the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, otherwise known as the Area. 
The purpose of this article is not to provide a detailed analysis of the Advisory 
Opinion, in particular as it relates to the detailed regulation and potential 
liability of sponsoring States.2 These issues are hugely important for the oper-
ational eﬀectiveness of the Area and certain key aspects will be covered in this 
article as and when they arise.
Rather, the focus of this article is notably diﬀerent: it is to consider how far 
and to what extent the Seabed Disputes Chamber, in its Advisory Opinion, 
addresses foundational issues of international environmental law and the 
international law on sustainable development. Although sustainable develop-
ment is not directly referenced in the Advisory Opinion, it is far from hyper-
bolic to suggest that in this Advisory Opinion we see discussion of each of the 
seven principles identiﬁed by the International Law Association (ILA) in its 
2002 New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law relating to 
Sustainable Development, including the sustainable use of natural resources, 
the precautionary approach, common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities, and 
the principle of good governance. Are they all discussed coherently and com-
prehensively? No, that would be diﬃcult to expect and indeed probably 
beyond the judicial role within the conﬁnes of one Advisory Opinion. But 
does the Advisory Opinion give fresh insights into, and prompt new thinking 
on, many of these principles? Undoubtedly so. To that extent, the contribu-
tion of the 2011 Advisory Opinion to international environmental law and 
general international law is not only to be welcomed, but also to be studied 
closely. Simply because its subject-matter deals with arguably one of the least 
understood, and so far least operational, international regimes for the utiliza-
tion of some of the remotest and least accessible natural resources should not 
1 http://www.itlos.org/ﬁleadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf 
(last accessed: July 2011). Hereinafter: Advisory Opinion.
2 See D. Freestone, ‘Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber’ (9 March 2011) 
15(7) ASIL Insights; and D. Anton, R. Makgill and C. Payne, ‘Seabed Mining—Advisory 
Opinion on Responsibility and Liability’ (2011) 41 Environmental Policy and Law 60–65.
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diminish its general signiﬁcance. In short, whilst its focus and ultimate 
relevance are on the deep seabed, the 2011 Advisory Opinion will equally 
make a substantive contribution to our understanding of issues that are of 
global relevance.
Background to the Advisory Opinion
The deep seabed has been the subject of active international discussion since 
Dr. Arvid Pardo, the Maltese Ambassador to the United Nations, in 1967 
proposed collective oversight of its natural resources as a matter of common 
interest to mankind.3 This discussion translated into international activity 
with the adoption in the United Nations General Assembly of the 1969 ‘Mor-
atorium’ Resolution4 and the 1970 Declaration of Principles Governing the 
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction.5 Although the extent of the resources has quite under-
standably never been precisely determined, their potential signiﬁcance is clear. 
As the International Seabed Authority notes:
The existence on the deep ocean ﬂoor of potentially valuable polymetallic nod-
ules has been known for more than a century. Scientists investigating these rocks, 
also known as manganese nodules, found that they contained valuable metals 
such as nickel, manganese, copper and cobalt. About the shape and size of pota-
toes, the dark-coloured nodules lie strewn atop the seabed, notably in the central 
Paciﬁc and Indian oceans . . . More recently, in the late 1970s, researchers learned 
of other mineral resources in the deep oceans, containing many of the same met-
als, along with gold and silver. These are polymetallic sulphides, formed around 
hot springs in active volcanic areas, and cobalt-rich crusts, fused to the underly-
ing rock around ridges and seamounts in all the world’s oceans.6
3 For a general discussion of the Area, see S. Nandan, ‘Administering the Mineral Resources 
of the Deep Seabed’ in: D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress 
and Prospects (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 75–92.
4 UNGA Res. 2574 D (XXIV) (1969).
5 UNGA Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970).
6 International Seabed Authority (hereinafter, the Authority), Brochure; http://www.isa.org
.jm/ﬁles/documents/EN/Brochures/ENG1.pdf (last accessed: July 2011). For clariﬁcation, 
the LOSC deﬁnes ‘resources’ in the context of the Area as: “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral 
resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules” (LOSC 
133(a)), with Article 133(b) going on to note that “resources, when recovered from the Area, 
are referred to as ‘minerals’”.
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As uncertain as the extent of the natural resources was, the legal and political 
debates nevertheless quickly revealed a signiﬁcant schism in approach. 
Although the notion of “common heritage of mankind” was settled upon as 
the conceptual framework under which the Area would be governed, the 
detail of its governance and importantly its customary status increasingly 
became matters of high politics. While some of this reﬂected what would 
become broader divisions between developed and developing countries sur-
rounding the New International Economic Order later in the 1970s,7 a par-
ticular issue as regards the Area was the extent to which a State’s traditional 
freedom of the high seas could be curtailed by a General Assembly Resolu-
tion, prior to the entry into force (or at least the adoption and signature) of a 
treaty-based regime. Whereas many, primarily developing, States felt the com-
bined eﬀect of the two General Assembly Resolutions was to restrict unilateral 
action, many developed States were equally adamant that they were political 
aspirations and that until such a treaty system was concluded, States remained 
free to exercise their traditional rights and freedoms.8
Such a regime came into being with Part XI of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC or the Convention; 21 Interna-
tional Legal Materials 1261 (1982); in force 16 November 1994). Equally 
well-rehearsed was the almost immediate dislike by numerous developed States 
of the bureaucracy of the institutions established and the alleged deviation 
from fundamental precepts of a market economy. The most vocal (and most 
interested) of these States thereby established the Reciprocal States Regime, 
which, if not a competing system in a technical sense, certainly undermined 
the (hoped for) universal nature of the International Seabed Authority, 
which was to be established by the Convention on its entry into force. The 
1994 Implementation Agreement9 signiﬁcantly altered the operation of the 
regime—with the hope and expectation that many of the developed States 
that had yet to ratify the LOSC would now do so—and whilst the overarch-
ing ethos remained institutional management of the Area’s natural resources 
and universal beneﬁt arising from exploitation thereof (both reﬂected in the 
ideal of the common heritage of mankind), the regime as it now exists is quite 
distinct from that originally envisaged, with much more emphasis on market 
7 See R. Prakesh Anand, Legal Regime of the Sea-bed and the Developing Countries (New Delhi, 
Thomson Press, 1976).
8 Cf. D. Rothwell and T. Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford, Hart, 2010) 
128: “The major powers certainly took the view that the [1969] resolution was recommenda-
tory only, while at the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, taking steps to restrain deep 
seabed mining”.
9 Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (33 
ILM 1309 (1994)).
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economics and much less emphasis on the founding (re)distributive function. 
Certain aspects of the current regime will be discussed in due course.
The Particular Needs of Sponsoring (Developing) States
The Advisory Opinion discussed in this article arose from a request by Nauru 
for legal clariﬁcation as to the scope of its and other developing countries’ 
responsibilities when they sponsor natural or legal persons to undertake explo-
ration activities in the Area. Although there is nothing to stop a country itself 
from undertaking such activities, in reality and especially for developing coun-
tries this is most likely to occur by private entities or, in some instances, State-
owned companies. Nauru’s request arose from an application for approval of 
a plan of work for exploration submitted by Nauru Ocean Resources Inc., 
submitted at the same time as an application by Tonga Oﬀshore Mining Ltd. 
(sponsored by Tonga), both in 2008.10 Nauru was concerned that as a devel-
oping country it could face prohibitive potential liabilities by sponsoring a 
private entity. Nauru, like many other developing States, does not yet possess 
the technical and ﬁnancial capacity to undertake seaﬂoor mining in interna-
tional waters. To participate eﬀectively in activities in the Area, these States 
must engage entities in the global private sector (in much the same way as 
some countries seek to attract foreign direct investment). Not only do some 
developing States lack the ﬁnancial capacity to execute a seaﬂoor mining proj-
ect in international waters, but some also cannot aﬀord exposure to the legal 
risks potentially associated with such a project.11
The requirement of sponsorship (as a separate and additional requirement 
to the obligation that such entities either be nationals of the State party or be 
eﬀectively controlled by nationals of that State party, or indeed the State 
itself )12 ensures a direct link between the entity seeking to undertake activities 
10 Further details can be found at Advisory Opinion, paragraph 4. Consideration by the 
Authority of the applications was postponed at the request of the applicants in 2009. How-
ever, on 19 July 2011, during the seventeenth session of the Authority, and following the 
delivery of the Advisory Opinion, the Seabed Council approved the applications. During the 
debate on the applications, Germany made note of “the recent advisory opinion of the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber in which the judges said that sponsoring States should have laws, regula-
tions and administrative measures in place for ‘active supervision of the activities of the spon-
sored contractor’”(Press Release (19 July 2011): Seabed Council approves Applications for 
Exploratory Contracts with Authority in Deep Seabed Area; http://www.isa.org.jm/ﬁles/
documents/EN/Press/Press11/SB-17–11.pdf (last accessed: July 2011)).
11 ISBA/16/C/6, paragraph 5 quoted by the Chamber in Advisory Opinion, paragraph 4.
12 Both requirements are contained in LOSC Article 153(2)(b) and Annex III, Article 4.
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in the Area13 and the State which has legal obligations under the Convention. 
As the Chamber noted, “sponsorship . . . is to achieve the result that the obliga-
tions set out in the Convention, a treaty under international law which binds 
only States Parties thereto, are complied with by entities that are subjects of 
domestic legal systems”.14 Although this is a general point of international law, 
and cannot be said to raise anything particular about international environ-
mental law or sustainable development, the requirement of sponsorship is at 
least a reminder of an alternative means by which private entities can be 
brought within the framework of the international rule of law.15 Although, as 
with much of the regulation of the Area, one must be careful not to extrapo-
late too broadly from the undoubted sui generis nature of this particular 
regime, the relationship between the “sponsor” and the “sponsored” does 
highlight the capacity of the international community to develop creative and 
innovative mechanisms of control, when necessary. There is, however, one 
aspect of the sponsorship relationship that this article will refer to later, which 
ties very closely to the principle of good governance in the New Delhi 
13 It was fundamental for the Chamber to deﬁne accurately what is meant by “activities in the 
area” (Advisory Opinion, paragraphs 82–97). Although the LOSC provides a broad deﬁnition: 
“all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area” (LOSC Article 
1(1)(3)), this leaves much undetermined. The Chamber was assisted by deﬁnitions of ‘explora-
tion’ and ‘exploitation’ in the 2000 and 2010 Regulations (paragraphs 89–90). In addition, 
the Chamber came to the view that whilst certain supplementary activities such as lifting the 
minerals to the surface, “shipboard processing” (paragraph 88), “evacuation of water from the 
minerals and the preliminary separation of materials of no commercial interest, including their 
disposal at sea” (paragraph 95) and ship-to-ship transfer (where the former lifts the minerals 
and the latter undertakes certain preliminary processing) all fell within the deﬁnition, trans-
portation of the minerals to port and land-based processing did not. In coming to its judg-
ment, the Chamber was inﬂuenced by not wishing to create potential conﬂicts with the rules 
of other maritime regimes (e.g., high seas), whilst at the same time ensuring that activities 
closely connected to the initial exploration/exploitation activity, and which indeed presented 
some of the most signiﬁcant risks to the marine environment, would come within the remit of 
the Authority’s rules (paragraph 97).
14 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 75.
15 The responsibilities of private/commercial actors, and how to encourage their compliance 
with international rules of good conduct, have been very much at the forefront of recent dis-
cussions on corporate social responsibility, as is shown by the 2011 Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corpo-
rations and other business enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (A/HRC/17/31, 
21 March 2011); http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf (last 
accessed: August 2011).
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Declaration, and that is how the sponsoring State should regulate the spon-
sored entity, and, more speciﬁcally, whether that should be through private or 
public law.
The Seabed Disputes Chamber and Advisory Opinion Procedure
Before considering the substance of the Advisory Opinion itself, a few words 
on the Seabed Disputes Chamber and the process that it followed in this par-
ticular case seem appropriate. The Chamber is established by virtue of LOSC 
Article 186, as ampliﬁed by Article 14 and section 4 of Annex VI thereto. The 
jurisdiction of the Chamber is notably diﬀerent from the ITLOS (from which 
it is a “separate judicial body”),16 including the jurisdiction to resolve conten-
tious disputes not only between States Parties inter se and between States Par-
ties and the Authority but also, in certain instances, between the Authority 
and prospective contractors, State enterprises or sponsored entities.17 It is sig-
niﬁcant that the Chamber also has the authority to hand down advisory opin-
ions, if requested to do so by the Council or Assembly of the International 
Seabed Authority.18 Indeed, there was some discussion before the Chamber 
whether in this regard it was diﬀerent from the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), which has the discretion whether to respond positively to a request for 
an advisory opinion; it was noted that advisory opinions from the Chamber 
“shall be given as a matter of urgency”.19 The Chamber itself did not address 
the issue of whether it had discretion in this regard, noting that in this par-
ticular instance, it was in any event answering the questions put to it.20
But equally interesting is the reference to urgency, which the Chamber 
seems to have taken to its heart, particularly when one notes that the request 
from the Council was made in May 2010, oral hearings were held in Septem-
ber and the Advisory Opinion was released the following February. Perhaps it 
is no wonder, therefore, that the Chamber noted that “[t]he functions of the 
Chamber . . . are relevant for the good governance of the Area”, going on to 
point out “by answering the questions it will assist the Council in the perfor-
mance of its activities and contribute to the implementation of the Conven-
tion’s regime”.21 Although somewhat a sine qua non, this aspect of good 
16 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 25.
17 Article 187 LOSC.
18 Article 191 LOSC.
19 Emphasis added.
20 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 48.
21 Ibid., paragraphs 29–30.
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governance of natural resource management is easily forgotten, namely the 
role of judicial bodies to utilise general principles and the rule of law both to 
resolve disputes (i.e., its contentious jurisdiction)22 and, as in the present 
Advisory Opinion, to assist political bodies in the accomplishment of their 
duties by acting as an “independent and impartial body”.23
There was a great deal of interest in this Advisory Opinion: twelve States, 
the International Seabed Authority, two intergovernmental organisations24 
and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) submitted writ-
ten statements. At the hearings, the Authority, nine States and the two inter-
governmental organisations made oral statements. In addition, two 
non-governmental organisations (World Wide Fund for Nature and Green-
peace International) submitted a written statement and a request to partici-
pate as amici curiae. The written statement was not accepted as it fell outside 
Article 133 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, which limits such involve-
ment to intergovernmental organisations. Nevertheless, although the state-
ment was not formally included within the case ﬁle, it was posted on the 
Tribunal’s website and the Authority and participating States Parties and 
intergovernmental organisations were duly informed of its existence.25 Sepa-
rately, the non-governmental organisations were notiﬁed that the Chamber 
had decided not to allow them to participate in oral proceedings.26 This reﬂects 
the traditional understanding of the (non-)role of non-governmental organi-
sations in general international dispute settlement and advisory jurisdiction. 
Although it might be considered regressive in light of (admittedly sometimes 
limited) developments in other ﬁelds, namely trade and investment disputes,27 
the rather creative means by which the written statement was brought to the 
attention of the participating States and organisations should be noted. But of 
course, this (at best) informal status prevented meaningful use of its contents, 
22 T. Stephens, ‘Sustainability Discourses in International Courts: What Place for Global Jus-
tice?’ in: D. French (ed.), Global Justice and Sustainable Development (Leiden/Boston, Marti-
nus Nijhoﬀ, 2010) 56: “Fairness and justice, notions that underlie not only sustainability, but 
also principles of equity that have long been applicable in the resolution of disputes over natu-
ral resources . . . there remain many opportunities for their deployment to resolve fractious 
disputes over natural resources at a time of growing scarcity and accelerating environmental 
degradation”.
23 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 26.
24 Namely, the Interoceanmetal Joint Organization and the International Union for Conser-
vation of Nature (IUCN).
25 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 13.
26 Ibid., paragraph 14.
27 See, for instance, K. Tienhaara, ‘Third Party Participation in Investment-Environment Dis-
putes: Recent Developments’ (2007) 16 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 230.
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unless it was ‘picked up’ and used by one of the formal participants. In light 
of how substantively progressive the Advisory Opinion is in many respects, it 
is perhaps unfortunate that procedurally the international judicial commu-
nity still has some way to go, especially as other tribunals have begun to accept 
amicus curiae briefs.
Applicable Law, Interpretation and Remit of the Advisory Opinion
Two ﬁnal preliminary issues are worth brieﬂy mentioning. The ﬁrst is the mat-
ter of applicable law and interpretation. The Convention and ITLOS’s Statute 
set out the applicable law, which include the 1982 Convention, the 1994 
Implementation Agreement, rules and regulations lawfully adopted by the 
Authority and “other rules of applicable law not [otherwise] incompatible”.28 
Of particular signiﬁcance were the ‘rules and regulations’ promulgated by the 
Authority, to be considered as secondary legislation, although equally binding 
on the States Parties. These were the 2000 Regulations on Prospecting and 
Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area and the 2010 Regulations 
on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area.29 The 
Chamber relies upon the reasoning of the ICJ’s 2010 Advisory Opinion on 
the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo30 to come to the 
view that the interpretation provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, which it had just noted were reﬂective of custom (some-
thing the ITLOS itself had never expressly done), “may, by analogy, provide 
guidance” to the interpretation of legally binding documents, which never-
theless are not treaties.31 As will become evident, this was not the only time 
28 Article 293(1) LOSC.
29 These regulations, together with other relevant rules, will together form part of what is 
referred to as the ‘mining code’. The Authority says that “The ‘Mining Code’ refers to the 
whole of the comprehensive set of rules, regulations and procedures issued by the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority to regulate prospecting, exploration and exploitation of marine min-
erals in the international seabed Area”; http://www.isa.org.jm/en/documents/mcode (last 
accessed: July 2011).
30 Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of 
Kosovo ( Judgment of 22 July 2010, paragraph 94); http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ﬁles/
141/15987.pdf (last accessed: August 2011).
31 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 60. Nevertheless, it is important and relevant here to note that 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) goes on to say that “Security Council resolutions are 
issued by a single, collective body and are drafted through a very diﬀerent process than that 
used for the conclusion of a treaty. Security Council resolutions are the product of a voting 
process as provided for in Article 27 of the Charter, and the ﬁnal text of such resolutions rep-
resents the view of the Security Council as a body” (paragraph 94).
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that the Chamber relies—and builds upon—the reasoning of other courts 
and tribunals, most notably the ITLOS and the ICJ.
The ﬁnal preliminary issue is the questions that the Council sought answers 
to. In summary form, they were as follows: (i) what are the responsibilities and 
obligations of sponsoring States under the regime established by LOSC Part 
XI and the 1994 Implementation Agreement? (ii) what is the extent of the 
liability of sponsoring States for a failure of a sponsored entity to comply with 
relevant provisions? Finally, (iii) what measures must a sponsoring State 
undertake to fulﬁl its responsibilities under the Convention? All three ques-
tions are intimately related, as determining the necessary measures to be taken 
(in answering question 3) will both contribute to whether the sponsoring 
State has met its obligations under the Convention (question 1) and thus 
whether it has exemption against liability for any damage caused (question 2). 
As beﬁtting a judicial chamber, the Chamber limited itself largely to answer-
ing the questions asked and did not range too broadly in its judicial role. 
Nevertheless, in answering these questions, the Chamber makes a number of 
more general comments, which supports a ﬁnding that the Advisory Opinion 
is of broader relevance. Of particular importance are its remarks on the ‘obli-
gation to ensure’, otherwise referred to as due diligence, on the precautionary 
approach and on enforcing community interests, including seemingly to 
aﬃrm the putative existence of actio popularis (a claim brought on behalf of 
the international community) in this area of the law.
The Advisory Opinion: a ‘Sustainable Development’ Judgment?
Before considering the substance of the Advisory Opinion and the extent to 
which it deals with particular principles and themes of sustainable develop-
ment, it is useful to consider brieﬂy the question whether this really is a ‘sus-
tainable development’ case, thus bringing into sharp focus the normative 
relationship between international law on sustainable development and other 
areas of international law.32 As already noted, the phrase ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ is not referenced in the Advisory Opinion,33 which may come as little 
32 See D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2005) 37: “It is quite clear that the legal implications of sustain-
able development are not restricted to international environmental law stricto sensu, though 
neither is there much value in treating the concept as an all-embracing term to cover the 
whole terrain presently covered by, inter alia, international environmental, economic, trade 
and social law”.
33 But note Advisory Opinion, paragraph 159: “the highest standards of protection of the 
marine environment, the safe development of activities in the Area and protection of the 
common heritage of mankind”.
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surprise, as so far the concept has found limited expression within the texts 
and discussions on the Area. This silence, of course, is not determinative, as 
that has not prevented other judicial tribunals in utilising this and other cog-
nate concepts relatively liberally.34 However, the generic idea of ‘development’, 
in contrast to the perhaps more technical notion of sustainable utilisation of 
natural resources, has generally been conceptually restricted to areas within a 
State’s territory, or at least its jurisdiction, e.g., the exclusive economic zone, 
and has rarely been discussed in relation to global areas, such as the deep sea-
bed beyond national jurisdiction.35 Although the 1987 World Commission’s 
report, Our Common Future, which initiated the current sustainable develop-
ment discourse, mentioned the deep seabed,36 the 1992 inter-governmental 
plan of action, Agenda 21, did not. Sustainable development is thus still very 
much perceived primarily in terms of endogenous economic growth and its 
linkage to social improvement. When oceans are considered, it is usually from 
either a ﬁsheries/food security perspective or because of concerns relating to 
marine pollution from ship-based or land-based sources.37
Although the governance of the Area has rarely been understood by refer-
ence to sustainable development, the role of the Authority in managing 
the natural resources of the deep seabed to contribute to socio-economic 
34 For instance, Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway between The King-
dom of Belgium and The Kingdom of The Netherlands (The Hague, 24 May 2005) paragraph 58: 
“There is considerable debate as to what, within the ﬁeld of environmental law, constitutes 
‘rules’ or ‘principles’; what is ‘soft law’; and which environmental treaty law or principles have 
contributed to the development of customary international law . . . The emerging principles, 
whatever their current status, make reference to conservation, management, notions of pre-
vention and of sustainable development, and protection for future generations”; http://pca-
cpa.org/upload/ﬁles/BE-NL%20Award%20240505.pdf (last accessed: August 2011).
35 Cf. Convention on Biological Diversity—COP 8 Decision VIII/21: “Marine and coastal 
biological diversity: conservation and sustainable use of deep seabed genetic resources beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction”, paragraph 1: “Notes that deep seabed ecosystems beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction . . . contain genetic resources of great interest for their biodi-
versity value and for scientiﬁc research as well as for present and future sustainable development 
and commercial applications” (emphasis added); http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=11035 
(last accessed: August 2011).
36 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1987) 273: “Over 45 per cent of the planet’s surface, this sea-bed area 
and its resources are declared to be the ‘common heritage of mankind’, a concept that repre-
sents a milestone in the realm of international co-operation”.
37 Plan of Implementation of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, paragraph 
30: “Oceans, seas, islands and coastal areas form an integrated and essential component of the 
Earth’s ecosystem and are critical for global food security and for sustaining economic pros-
perity and the well-being of many national economies, particularly in developing countries”; 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm (last 
accessed: August 2011).
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development within environmental limits will undoubtedly be strengthened 
by this Advisory Opinion. In particular, the Chamber is keen to stress, in 
addition to the imperative of the protection of the marine environment, the 
developmental—in contrast to the purely commercial—objective of the Area. 
The following quotation is of singular importance and worth quoting in full:
It should be pointed out that . . . the Convention emphasizes that the achieve-
ment of the goals of the Convention will “contribute to the realization of a just 
and equitable international economic order which takes into account the inter-
ests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular, the special interests and 
needs of developing countries, whether coastal or landlocked” . . . article 148 of 
the Convention speaks about the promotion of the eﬀective participation of 
developing States in activities in the Area. What is more important is that Annex 
III, article 9, paragraph 4, of the Convention speciﬁcally refers to the right of a 
developing State or any natural or juridical person sponsored by it and eﬀectively 
controlled by it, to inform the Authority that it wishes to submit a plan of work 
with respect to a reserved area. These provisions have the eﬀect of reserving half 
of the proposed contract areas in favour of the Authority and developing States. 
Together with [other provisions] they require eﬀective implementation with a 
view to enabling the developing States to participate in deep seabed mining on 
an equal footing with developed States.38
Thus, as noted in the introduction, it is by no means hyperbolic to see the 
Advisory Opinion as not only supporting sustainable development at a gen-
eral level but, more than that, in actually seeking to address various emerging 
normative aspects of the concept. To assist in this regard, the ILA’s 2002 New 
Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law relating to Sustainable 
Development is used in this article to help frame the analysis.39 It is arguably 
the most prominent text on the legal implications of sustainable development, 
despite its non-governmental nature. The Declaration contains seven princi-
ples, which are set out below: (i) the duty of States to ensure sustainable use 
of natural resources, (ii) equity and the eradication of poverty, (iii) common 
but diﬀerentiated responsibilities, (iv) the precautionary approach, (v) par-
ticipation, (vi) good governance, and (vii) integration and interrelationship. 
The remainder of this article will not provide a comprehensive analysis of how 
the Chamber references these principles, but will rather focus on what the 
Chamber had to say on four of them, namely the sustainable use of natural 
resources, the precautionary approach, common but diﬀerentiated responsi-
bilities, and good governance. This is not an attempt to pigeon-hole the many 
38 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 163. 
39 ILA Resolution 3/2002, Annex as published as UN Doc. A/57/329 (2002); http://www
.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/25 (last accessed: August 2011).
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issues the Chamber addresses artiﬁcially within certain “sustainable develop-
ment” principles, but rather to group together cognate matters and highlight 
how the Advisory Opinion has arguably made a signiﬁcant and substantive 
contribution to the broader jurisprudence on international environmental 
law, the emerging ﬁeld of international law on sustainable development and 
indeed general international law.
The Duty of States to Ensure Sustainable Use of Natural Resources
The duty of States to ensure the sustainable use of natural resources, as framed 
by the ILA, is a broad notion, reﬂecting a number of inter-connected obliga-
tions in international law, some of which are settled (namely, Principle 21 of 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, cited below) 
and others which remain nascent and contested (namely, that States should 
manage their ‘territorial’ natural resources sustainably). The New Delhi Dec-
laration expressly references the resources of the deep seabed, amongst other 
areas, as the common heritage of mankind. Nevertheless, beyond endorsing 
certain fundamental ideas—including, albeit of less relevance here, the com-
mon concern of humankind40—it is widely accepted that the general obliga-
tion to sustainably use natural resources is heavily context-dependent, and 
much detail is left to international treaties and other instruments and/or 
domestic legislation.41 Moreover, in responding to the questions put to it, the 
Chamber does not directly address the question as to what standards a spon-
sored contractor must adhere. Rather, it focuses upon the obligations of the 
sponsoring State in ensuring compliance by the contractor with its commit-
ments—these being variously found in “its contract and its obligations under 
this Convention”,42 which must equally be taken to include the Regulations 
lawfully adopted by the Authority, as well as other rules and procedures of 
the Authority.
In light of this, this section of this article focuses upon three incidental 
aspects of the general obligation of sustainable use, relating speciﬁcally to the 
responsibilities of the sponsoring State. These are as follows. First: what the 
40 New Delhi Declaration, paragraph 1.3: “The protection, preservation and enhancement of 
the natural environment, particularly the proper management of climate system, biological 
diversity and fauna and ﬂora of the Earth, are the common concern of humankind”. 
41 P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2009, 3rd ed.) 200–201: “little of value can be inferred from a broad 
principle of sustainable use without reference to state practice and the practice of international 
organizations”.
42 LOSC Annex III, Article 4, paragraph 4.
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Convention refers to as the sponsoring State’s “responsibility to ensure” that 
the contractor meets its own commitments, which the Chamber rightly char-
acterises as an obligation of due diligence. Second: the obligation to require 
the undertaking of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and monitor-
ing thereafter. Third: recognition of the universal nature of regulating activi-
ties in the Area, thus justifying a high level of cooperation, emergency assistance 
and, a matter of importance of general international law, the right to bring 
claims for damage arising from activities in the Area. As became apparent 
from the Chamber’s reasoning, there is a synergy between regulation of the 
deep seabed and general international law. Not only does the Chamber ﬁnd 
support for its views on how the Area should be regulated from other aspects 
of international law (and from other tribunals, notably the ICJ), but in equal 
measure, what the Chamber has to say on the Area—and how it says it—is of 
signiﬁcance, more broadly. This two-way process of reasoning is of central 
importance in promoting the general value of the Advisory Opinion to a 
wider audience, beyond those specially interested in the governance of the 
deep seabed.
“Responsibility to Ensure”: Obligation of Due Diligence
The central question that the Chamber was called upon to answer was: what 
is required of a sponsoring State in ensuring a sponsored contractor meets its 
own commitments in relation to activities in the Area. The Chamber notes 
that the Convention places a sponsoring State under the “responsibility to 
ensure that activities in the Area . . . shall be carried out in conformity” with 
the regime.43 The Chamber characterises this obligation as a means—or a 
“mechanism”—by which the rules of the regime “become eﬀective” for private 
contractors and which will ultimately “ﬁnd their legal basis in domestic law”.44 
As the Chamber notes, the “responsibility to ensure” is relied upon when, 
although the traditional principle of State responsibility for private behaviour 
(namely, that the actions of a private individual are not attributable to the 
State)45 is “not considered satisfactory”, the notion that the State would be 
43 Article 139 LOSC.
44 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 108.
45 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, commentary to Article 8 (Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-Third Session, 47; http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
publications/yearbooks/contents/2001_v1_e.pdf: “As a general principle, the conduct of pri-
vate persons or entities is not attributable to the State under international law. Circumstances 
may arise, however, where such conduct is nevertheless attributable to the State because there 
exists a speciﬁc factual relationship between the person or entity engaging in the conduct and 
the State”.
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held responsible for “each and every violation”46 by a private actor would 
equally be the wrong response to the situation. In other words, neither the 
laissez faire nor the complete attribution approach is appropriate; however, 
what is justiﬁable “is an obligation to deploy adequate means, to exercise best 
possible eﬀorts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result”.47 As the Chamber 
notes, it is an obligation of conduct, not of result, and in increasingly com-
mon legal usage, it is “an obligation of ‘due diligence’”.48 The Chamber relies 
upon the commentary to the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 2001 
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities to 
substantiate this ﬁnding: “It is the conduct of the State of origin that will 
determine whether the State has complied with its obligation”.49
The idea that States are required to exercise regulatory diligence to ensure 
private actors meet a certain level of behaviour is neither new nor certainly not 
unique to this area of the law. It is an idea that has a long history in interna-
tional law, most famously expressed by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case.50 It 
is signiﬁcant that it has become accepted as the normative standard on States 
for compliance with Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, accepted as 
customary law, which imposes upon them ‘the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the envi-
ronment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.51 
The ties of nationality and eﬀective control required for sponsorship in rela-
tion to the Area (as already discussed) thus provide the necessary legal link for 
reasons of jurisdiction with the sponsoring State. The Chamber, whilst not 
directly quoting either the Corfu Channel decision or the Stockholm Declara-
tion (or the similar provision at Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration), does 
46 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 112.
47 Ibid., paragraph 110.
48 Ibid.
49 2001 Articles on Transboundary Harm, commentary to Article 3 (ILC, supra note 45, 154). 
Technically, the Articles do not apply to common areas as ‘transboundary harm’ is narrowly 
deﬁned as: “‘Transboundary harm’ means harm caused in the territory of or in other places 
under the jurisdiction or control of a State other than the State of origin, whether or not the 
States concerned share a common border” (152). Nevertheless, the discussion of due diligence 
is undoubtedly reﬂective of the requirements on States under the broader obligation to be 
found in customary law, on which see below.
50 Judgment of 9 April 1949 (Merits), ICJ Reports (1949) 4, 22: “not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”.
51 See also Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 
(1996) 226, 241–242: “The existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states and of 
areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment”.
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refer to LOSC Article 194(2), which codiﬁed Principle 21 in the context of 
the law of the sea, to support its analysis.
What the Chamber does rely on, however, is the recent judgment of the 
ICJ in Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (2010) to cement this 
connexion between “responsibility to ensure” and due diligence. Although the 
case concerned a dispute between Uruguay and Argentina over a shared trans-
boundary watercourse, nevertheless the Chamber ﬁnds the reasoning highly 
persuasive. Indeed, this is a judgment the Chamber relies on signiﬁcantly at 
various points in the Advisory Opinion. Whilst each case is bounded by its 
own facts and applicable law, there is no doubt that the Chamber ﬁnds ben-
eﬁt in placing the sponsoring State’s duties within the broader customary 
framework outlined by the ICJ. In particular, the quoted part of the Pulp 
Mills judgment is illuminating here because it highlights the comprehensive 
nature of due diligence, an issue that the Chamber itself picks up later in the 
Advisory Opinion. As the ICJ notes: “It is an obligation which entails not 
only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level of 
vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control . . . such 
as the monitoring of activities”.52 Such pro-activity is something that the 
Chamber clearly expects from sponsoring States in regulating all stages of 
activities in the Area.
If the conﬂation of the “responsibility to ensure” and due diligence is largely 
unsurprising, the Chamber’s understanding of what is required of a sponsor-
ing State in meeting its due diligence obligation is worthy of more reﬂection. 
Building upon the general understanding of due diligence, the Chamber 
emphasises the factual nature of the obligation, noting that it “may not easily 
be described in precise terms . . . ‘due diligence’ is a variable concept”.53 The 
Chamber emphasises a range of factors that might aﬀect what is required of 
sponsoring States and thus vary the level of due diligence expected. First, the 
general state of knowledge will be constantly shifting—improving—because 
of fresh insights and new information. As it said, “measures considered suﬃ-
ciently diligent at a certain moment may become not diligent enough in 
light . . . of new scientiﬁc or technological knowledge”.54 Second, the level of 
due diligence will depend upon the nature of the risks and, related to this, 
the nature of the activities undertaken. Prospecting is usually less likely to 
cause damage than exploration, which similarly has fewer risks attached than 
52 Judgment of 20 April 2010, paragraph 197; http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ﬁles/135/15877
.pdf (last accessed: August 2011); hereinafter: Pulp Mills.
53 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 117.
54 Ibid.
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exploitation.55 Third, the risks may vary depending upon the precise minerals 
subject to mining activity. Thus, in what must be a general truism of relevance 
to the regulation of any potentially hazardous activity, and certainly builds 
upon the work of the ILC in this ﬁeld,56 the Chamber notes that “[t]he stan-
dard of due diligence has to be more severe for the riskier activities”.57
A ﬁnal aspect of due diligence, and one which is central to how the Cham-
ber seeks to draw together the various normative seams in the regime, is to 
relate the due diligence obligation of sponsoring States, on the one hand, to 
what it refers to as its direct obligations under the Convention and the Regu-
lations, on the other. These direct obligations exist for sponsoring States inde-
pendently of ensuring contractors comply with their obligations. Such 
obligations include the obligation to respect the precautionary approach, to 
support and require EIA and best environmental practices, and to support the 
Authority both generally and in emergencies. Although each is an autono-
mous obligation within the governance of the regime, and States will be held 
accountable accordingly for breaches thereof, nevertheless the Chamber is 
equally clear as to their relationship with the broader duty of due diligence. As 
it says, “compliance with these obligations can also be seen as a relevant factor 
in meeting the due diligence ‘obligation to ensure’ and that the said obliga-
tions are in most cases couched as obligations to ensure compliance with a 
speciﬁc rule”.58 The signiﬁcance of this statement should not be easily dis-
missed. For reasons explained below, not only does this incorporate within the 
due diligence obligation requirements that were not otherwise extant in the 
Convention at the time of its adoption, but equally it enriches due diligence 
and highlights the integrated and over-arching nature of the obligation. As a 
question of fact, it is surely correct that due diligence should not be compart-
mentalised and segregated from other relevant provisions, but rather should 
be informed by them. While the Chamber is less clear on how this integration 
of obligations is to occur—as will be noted, when discussing best environ-
mental practices in this context, the Chamber adds the important qualiﬁer “in 
general terms”—such integration does reinforce the due diligence obligation. 
As a question of fact, whether the level of regulatory behaviour undertaken by 
55 Ibid.
56 2001 Articles on Transboundary Harm, commentary to Article 3 (ILC, supra note 45, 154): 
“The standard of due diligence against which the conduct of the State of origin should be 
examined is that which is generally considered to be appropriate and proportional to the 
degree of risk of transboundary harm in the particular instance. For example, activities which 
may be considered ultrahazardous require a much higher standard of care in designing policies 
and a much higher degree of vigour on the part of the State to enforce them”.
57 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 117. 
58 Ibid., paragraph 123.
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any sponsoring State meets the due diligence obligation is inherently diﬃcult 
to assess and prone to subjective interpretation. Nevertheless, due diligence is 
also a legal issue and the Chamber has set a reasonably clear benchmark of 
what it expects of sponsoring States.
Environmental Impact Assessment: The New Environmental Customary Norm
One particular aspect of especial importance to the Chamber is the require-
ment of an EIA. The Chamber recognises that the sponsoring State is under a 
due diligence obligation to ensure a potential contractor undertakes such an 
assessment prior to the submission of an application for a plan of work to the 
Authority. Moreover, as the Chamber notes, the Regulations equally impose a 
direct obligation on sponsoring States (and contractors) to work with the 
Authority to ensure the “establishment and implementation of programmes 
for monitoring and evaluating the impacts of deep seabed mining on the 
marine environment”.59 The inclusion of environmental monitoring ensures 
the obligation extends beyond the pre-approval stage to during and after such 
activities. Indeed, due to the remote nature of the environment in question, 
while the application of a plan of work requires a “preliminary” assessment of 
the impact of the activities on the marine environment,60 it is arguably the 
ongoing monitoring that provides the more eﬀective safeguard:
The Contractor shall, in accordance with the Regulations, gather environmental 
baseline data as exploration activities progress and develop and shall establish envi-
ronmental baselines against which to assess the likely eﬀects of the Contractor’s 
activities on the marine environment. The Contractor shall, in accordance with 
the Regulations, establish and carry out a programme to monitor and report on 
such eﬀects on the marine environment. The Contractor shall cooperate with the 
Authority in the implementation of such monitoring.61
Although such provisions are vital, the Chamber, conscious that the Nodules 
and Sulphides Regulations are per se limited in terms of the scope of activities 
they cover, is also clear in seeking to provide for a more comprehensive remit 
59 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 142.
60 Nodules Regulations, Annex 2, paragraph 24(c).
61 Nodules Regulations, Annex 4, paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 (emphasis added). See also para-
graph 5.5: “Prior to the commencement of testing of collecting systems and processing opera-
tions, the Contractor shall submit to the Authority: (a) A site-speciﬁc environmental impact 
statement”.
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for EIA and monitoring. Thus it emphasises both the conventional62 and cus-
tomary obligation of EIA, which together extend the requirement to under-
take EIA signiﬁcantly beyond the conﬁnes of the Regulations. Again the 
Chamber relies heavily upon the judgment of the ICJ in Pulp Mills for its 
reasoning. Whilst recognising the particular characteristics of that case—
transboundary, shared freshwater resources—the Chamber is convinced as to 
its overall utility in this regard. Indeed, the Chamber takes a number of points 
from it. First, it ﬁnds EIA to be a rule of customary law, which the ICJ also 
did—in that case concerning a shared watercourse.63 However, as the Cham-
ber notes: “The Court’s reasoning in a transboundary context may also apply 
to activities with an impact on the environment in an area beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction; and the Court’s references to ‘shared resources’ may 
also apply to resources that are the common heritage of mankind”.64
Second, the Chamber uses this newly declared rule of custom to bring 
within the remit of EIA other “activities . . . even beyond the scope of the 
Regulations”.65 Speciﬁcally, the Chamber is of the view that “EIAs should be 
included in the system of consultations and prior notiﬁcations set out in arti-
cle 142 of the Convention with respect to ‘resource deposits in the Area which 
lie across limits of national jurisdiction’”.66 This is undoubtedly obiter in terms 
of the Advisory Opinion—there was no need to discuss these particular activ-
ities—nevertheless, the Chamber’s ﬁnding of EIA to be a customary rule has 
allowed it to make more general claims.
Finally, the Chamber relies upon the ICJ to avoid having to be too precise 
about the contents of EIAs. As the ICJ itself carefully noted, the rule of cus-
tom in this area does not “specify the scope and content of an environmental 
impact assessment”.67 Of course, as regards those activities in the Area gov-
erned by the Regulations—as well as the 2002 Recommendations for the 
62 Article 206 LOSC: “When States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activ-
ities under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or signiﬁcant and 
harmful changes to the marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the poten-
tial eﬀects of such activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of the 
results of such assessments . . .”.
63 Pulp Mills, paragraph 204: “a practice, which in recent years has gained so much acceptance 
among States that it may now be considered a requirement under general international law to 
undertake an environmental impact assessment”. For general discussion on transboundary 
EIA, although prior to the International Court’s judgment in this case, see K. Bastmeijer and 
T. Koivurova (eds.), Theory and Practice of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment 
(Leiden, Martinus Nijhoﬀ, 2008).
64 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 148.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Pulp Mills, paragraph 205.
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Guidance of the Contractors for the Assessment of the Possible Environmen-
tal Impacts Arising from Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area68—
there is much more detail to guide sponsoring States and contractors. But the 
Chamber is equally clear that lack of precision or guidance is not a reason not 
to give eﬀect to this customary obligation and reiterates almost pointedly that 
the requirement of EIA exists “beyond the scope of application of speciﬁc 
provisions of the Regulations”.69
The Common Heritage of Mankind
Much of the stringency of the tone of the Advisory Opinion is aﬀected by the 
importance the Chamber gives to the Area as a common heritage of mankind, 
which elevates these particular natural resources, and this particular geograph-
ical region, to a special position in international law. As the Chamber states, 
“the role of the sponsoring State is to contribute to the common interest of all 
States in the proper implementation of the principle of the common heritage 
of mankind”.70 This is a good example of what occurs throughout the Advi-
sory Opinion, where the reasoning and rhetoric of common heritage infuse 
and strengthen the Chamber’s thinking. Of particular interest in this regard 
are the Chamber’s views on who can bring a claim against a sponsoring State 
in breach of its obligations under the regime. The Convention is silent on this 
matter, in contrast to an express provision relating to sponsored contractors 
for which the sponsoring State must ensure and enact appropriate recourse to 
compensation in domestic law.71 On the question on the liability of sponsor-
ing States, however, the Chamber is left with little guidance in the Conven-
tion or Regulations and turns to general international law. Although on such 
68 See, in particular, paragraph 5: “These recommendations for Guidance of Contractors 
describe the procedures to be followed in the acquisition of baseline data, and the monitoring 
to be performed during and after any activities in the exploration area with potential to cause 
serious harm to the environment. Their speciﬁc purposes are: (a) To deﬁne the biological, 
chemical, geological and physical components to be measured and the procedures to be 
followed by contractors to ensure eﬀective protection for the marine environment from harm-
ful eﬀects which may arise from the contractors’ activities in the Area . . .”. Despite the Cham-
ber referencing the 2002 Recommendations, they were amended slightly at the sixteenth 
session of the Authority (2010), and will thus likely be referred to in the future as the 2010 
Recommendations. 
69 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 150.
70 Ibid., paragraph 226.
71 Article 235(2) LOSC: “States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their 
legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage 
caused by pollution of the marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their 
jurisdiction”. 
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an important issue some may criticise the Advisory Opinion for lacking preci-
sion, this may be unfair criticism as the regime itself is itself silent on the mat-
ter. The Chamber “envisage[s”] that the type of damage compensable in such 
an instance would include damage to the Area and damage to the marine 
environment.72 It also speculates that claims could be made by coastal States 
(presumably under international law for any harm caused to a directly injured 
State) and “entities engaged in deep seabed mining” (although the basis of this 
claim is less clear, potentially contractual or even tortious).73
What is remarkable however, is the Chamber’s next step, ﬁlling a gap in 
both conventional and customary law. First, the Chamber determines that the 
Authority is itself entitled to make a claim—notwithstanding a lack of author-
ity in the Convention—presumably on the basis of implied powers of the 
Authority74 so as to give eﬀect to its responsibilities to act “on behalf ” of man-
kind as clearly referenced in the Convention.75 Moreover, the Chamber 
believes each State Party should be able to bring a claim against a sponsoring 
72 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 179.
73 Mention should also be made of potential harm to the interests of third parties involved 
in other marine activities, such as cable laying or ﬁshing. See Article 147(1) LOSC: “Activities 
in the Area shall be carried out with reasonable regard for other activities in the marine 
environment”.
74 On the theory of the implied powers of international organisations, and in particular in 
contrast to the more controversial notion of inherent powers, see V. Engström, ‘Powers of 
Organizations and the Many Faces of Autonomy’ in: R. Collins and N. White (eds.), Interna-
tional Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (London, Routledge, 2011) 213–229.
75 As only State Parties to the LOSC are entitled to sponsor contractors in the Area, the con-
tentious question of the Authority acting as ‘injured party’ against a non-member does not 
arise. What is interesting are the potential implications of the Advisory Opinion for future 
harm caused by the yet to be established Enterprise (the operational arm of the Authority). 
LOSC Annex IV, Article 2 states that “the Enterprise shall enjoy autonomy in the conduct of 
its operations” whilst Article 3 of the same Annex goes on to provide: “Nothing in this Con-
vention shall make the Enterprise liable for the acts or obligations of the Authority, or make 
the Authority liable for the acts or obligations of the Enterprise”. Nevertheless, can an organ 
of an international organisation claim against another organ? While this may be a theoretically 
interesting debate, reference should also be made to Article 170(2) LOSC: “The Enterprise 
shall act in accordance with this Convention and the rules, regulations and procedures of the 
Authority”, Annex III, Article 22: “the Authority shall have responsibility or liability for any 
damage arising out of wrongful acts in the exercise of its powers and functions”, as well as the 
fact that the Enterprise can only undertake projects once a plan of work—i.e., a contract—has 
been agreed with the Authority (Annex IV, Article 12). In short, the Enterprise would argu-
ably not only be directly obliged to respect the rules of the Area, including making reparation 
for harm caused, but would also be contractually obliged to do so, as shown by the standard 
clauses on responsibility and liability annexed to the Regulations. Presumably a request for an 
advisory opinion from the Seabed Disputes Chamber to determine the extent of liability 
might be a way forward in such a situation.
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State in breach to recover damages. The Chamber relies upon the argument 
that the obligations to protect the environment of the high seas and in the 
Area are of “erga omnes character”76—obligations opposable to the whole 
world, and in which the whole world has an interest. Although this is an 
assumption that many commentators would readily hold in relation to these 
areas of res communis and common heritage respectively, rarely—if ever—has 
it been said in judicial proceedings.77 Nevertheless, on the basis of this ﬁnd-
ing, the Chamber is conﬁdent that all States Parties have such a legal interest. 
To reinforce this view, the Chamber relies upon the International Law Com-
mission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, and especially Article 48 which 
provides such a right to invoke responsibility to “[a]ny State other than an 
injured State”.78 It was generally felt that Article 48 was a progressive develop-
ment, rather than a codiﬁcation, of existing law when included in the 2001 
Articles.79 The Advisory Opinion will thus certainly assist in cementing its 
position in international law, notwithstanding the many remaining questions 
surrounding it. However, the potentially radical claims made by the Chamber 
should not be lost here—the ﬁnding of erga omnes obligations, the aﬃrmation 
of essentially what would be an actio popularis in international environmental 
law,80 and the institutional right to claim. Nevertheless, on these points the 
Advisory Opinion undoubtedly ﬁts with the tenor of the governance of the 
Area generally, and it is unclear how objectionable most members of the inter-
national community will consider these ﬁndings in light of the particular 
nature of the Area.
76 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 180. On such obligations generally, see M. Ragazzi, The Con-
cept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997).
77 Cf. Birnie, et al., supra note 41, 233: “While . . . obligations of global environmental respon-
sibility may have an erga omnes partes character, in the sense that they are owed to all states 
acting through collective institutions of treaty supervision, in the 1974 Nuclear Tests Cases the 
ICJ was unsympathetic to the notion of an actio popularis allowing high seas freedoms to be 
enforced by any state”.
78 Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility goes on to set out what a State “other than 
an injured State” might “claim from the responsible States”, namely “(a) cessation of the inter-
nationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition . . .; and (b) perfor-
mance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest 
of the injured State or of the beneﬁciaries of the obligation breached”. 
79 C. Redgwell, ‘International Environmental Law’ in: M. Evans (ed.), International Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 3rd ed.) 697: “the status of [the] provision[. . .] 
remains de lege ferenda”.
80 For a general discussion, see J. Peel, ‘New State responsibility rules and compliance with 
multilateral environmental obligations—some case studies of how the new rules might apply 
in the international environmental context’ (2001) 10 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 82.
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The Precautionary Approach
As noted above, the Chamber found that many of the direct obligations 
imposed upon sponsoring States, either by virtue of the Convention or the 
Regulations, were also integral aspects of the general obligation of due dili-
gence. The eﬀect of this on the responsibilities of sponsoring States’ obliga-
tions should not be underestimated, nor the legal consequences ignored. By 
incorporating many of these direct obligations into the due diligence obliga-
tion, the Chamber was thus able not only to concurrently strengthen both 
the due diligence and the direct obligations but also simultaneously broaden 
their remit. In particular, as regards the precautionary approach, by requiring 
it as an element of due diligence, the Chamber extends its application to all 
relevant activities in the Area and not just the activities governed by the Regu-
lations.81 The legal signiﬁcance of this should not be lost; an obligation only 
contained within subsequent secondary regulations has now been transformed 
into a fundamental element of the conventional requirement on sponsoring 
States. Through this, the Chamber has refashioned States’ general obligations 
to take into account more recent legal developments. Although this is not the 
ﬁrst time a judicial tribunal has sought to give eﬀect to precaution without—
or with limited—explicit textual authorisation,82 nevertheless one should not 
ignore the overall signiﬁcance of what this change might mean. Sponsoring 
States will now be required to respect and apply the precautionary approach 
in all aspects of their activities in the Area. Of course, from an environmental 
perspective, a broad application of the precautionary approach is a positive 
development. However, one must equally be aware of the constantly precari-
ous role of the international judiciary in pushing forward the law too quickly. 
81 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 131: “the precautionary approach is also an integral part of the 
general obligation of due diligence of sponsoring States, which is applicable even outside the 
scope of the Regulations”. This article refers to the precautionary approach throughout, rather 
than the precautionary principle, but as the Advisory Opinion later indicates, the change in 
wording has little bearing on the issue of its legal status.
82 See, for instance, European Communities: Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones) (WT/DS26, WT/DS48; adopted on 13 February 1998) paragraph 124: “the precau-
tionary principle does not, by itself, and without a clear textual directive to that eﬀect, relieve 
a panel from the duty of applying the normal (i.e. customary international law) principles 
of treaty interpretation”. But note also in the same paragraph: “the precautionary principle 
indeed ﬁnds reﬂection in . . . the [Sanitary and Phytosanitary] Agreement . . . [Moreover] a panel 
charged with determining, for instance, whether “suﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence” exists . . . may, 
of course, and should, bear in mind that responsible, representative governments com-
monly act from perspectives of prudence and precaution where risks of irreversible, e.g. life-
terminating, damage to human health are concerned”; http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm (last accessed: August 2011).
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Nevertheless, on balance, most commentators will probably view the Cham-
ber’s judgment as altogether reasonable in light of the nature of the envi-
ronment in question, and in particular the way in which the precautionary 
approach is already embedded within aspects of the regime (with the consent 
of the States Parties). Thus it would seem logical, regardless of legal formality, 
to incorporate the precautionary approach within “due diligence”.
However, one should not lose sight of the normative ‘journey’ of the pre-
cautionary approach within the context of the Area. The Chamber maps out 
very succinctly its development from a ‘soft law’ principle to a binding direct 
legal obligation,83 and indeed on to a nascent rule of customary international 
law (on which see further below). It is important that the precautionary 
approach was incorporated within the Nodules and Sulphides Regulations, 
not by direct transposition but by express reference to the Rio Declaration; 
the Regulations84 note that States and the Authority “shall apply a precaution-
ary approach, as reﬂected in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration”.85 Moreover, 
the Chamber anticipates that the reference to the precautionary approach in 
the Regulations, which govern prospecting and exploration, will be repeated 
or indeed “further develop[ed]” by the Authority “when it regulates exploita-
tion activities and activities concerning other types of minerals”.86 Equally, the 
Chamber notes that the standard clauses for exploration in the Sulphides Reg-
ulations, which contractors sign, also contain reference to precaution. How-
ever, the Chamber does not pick up (or chooses not to do so) that the relevant 
standard clause states that precaution is to apply “as far as reasonably possible”, 
which is an important qualiﬁcation and would seem to distinguish between 
the imposition of the precautionary approach on sponsoring States and its 
application to contractors.
It is highly unusual—if not unique—for a judicial body to be given the 
opportunity to interpret the Rio Declaration. Other international courts and 
tribunals have reﬂected on ‘soft law’ declarations and principles,87 but rarely 
83 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 127: “The provisions of the . . . Regulations transform this 
non-binding statement of the precautionary approach in the Rio Declaration into a binding 
obligation”.
84 Namely Regulation 31(2) Nodules Regulations and Regulation 33(2) Sulphides 
Regulations.
85 Principle 15 Rio Declaration: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-eﬀective measures to prevent environmental degradation”.
86 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 130.
87 As the ICJ noted in Case concerning Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ 
Reports (1997) 7, 78: “new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great 
number of instruments during the last two decades”. More explicitly, the WTO Appellate 
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has a tribunal been able to give it legal eﬀect in quite the same manner. Thus, 
its interpretation of the precautionary approach should be at least noted, if not 
given special weight. The remainder of this section therefore focuses on two 
other aspects of the precautionary approach: ﬁrst, its legal status and second, 
its content. Finally, the section brieﬂy mentions the Chamber’s endorsement 
of best environmental practices, which it sees as very much supplementary to 
the precautionary approach.
Legal Status
The precautionary approach has proved to be an especially controversial aspect 
of international environmental law.88 Diﬀerent courts and tribunals have 
struggled to give it substantive eﬀect and to determine its legal status, includ-
ing panels and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the ICJ (ICJ) and the ITLOS.89 Moreover, while individual judges have varied 
in their tone from positive endorsement90 to circumspection,91 the tribunals 
themselves have largely eschewed answering the question about its legal status 
and focused upon less contentious aspects of the approach, notably synergies 
with established law. The Advisory Opinion should thus be seen as signiﬁcant, 
as arguably making the clearest statement yet about the legal status of the 
precautionary approach. The Chamber is of the view that the continual 
reliance on the precautionary approach in international treaties (as well as 
such other instruments as the Nodules and Sulphides Regulations themselves) 
“has initiated a trend towards making this approach part of customary 
Body in United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp products (‘Shrimp-
Turtle I’) (WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998) references the 1992 Rio Declara-
tion and Agenda 21 on several occasions.
88 For analysis, especially from a maritime context, see M. Fitzmaurice, Contemporary Issues in 
International Environmental Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2009) chapter 1. 
89 Ibid., at 4: “the practice of international courts and tribunals regarding the precautionary 
principle is mostly focused on the lengthy (and often not very illuminating) discussions 
whether or not it has already acquired the status of customary law or general principles 
of law”.
90 Case Concerning Pulp Mills (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures) (13 July 
2006), ICJ Reports (2006) 113, 152, dissenting opinion of ad hoc Judge Vinuesa: “the precau-
tionary principle is not an abstraction or an academic component of desirable soft law, but a 
rule of law within general international law as it stands today”.
91 Mox Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Order of 3 December 2001), separate opinion of 
Judge Wolfrum: “It is still a matter of discussion whether the precautionary principle or the 
precautionary approach in international environmental law has become part of international 
customary law”; http://www.itlos.org/ﬁleadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/sep.op
.Wolfrum.E.orig.pdf (last accessed: August 2011).
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international law”.92 Though still somewhat tentative and certainly not a 
declaratory statement of the law, it goes further than most tribunals have yet 
braved. As with the WTO Appellate Body, perhaps it is the specialist nature 
of the Chamber that prevented it from making a more deﬁnitive ruling. More-
over, this ﬁnding of an (admittedly inchoate) rule of custom was not through 
detailed examination of State practice and opinio juris but through the general 
summation of trends, which is a somewhat unfortunate, if necessary, charac-
teristic of general judicial ﬁndings of custom. This is not a criticism per se, but 
recognition of the rather incremental, sometimes sporadic, evolution of inter-
national law, especially in the ﬁeld of international environmental law.93
It is interesting that the Chamber does not come to this view without sup-
port; as with the customary status of EIA, the Chamber relies upon the ICJ’s 
decision in Pulp Mills to substantiate its position. It quotes the ICJ when it 
states that “a precautionary approach may be relevant in the interpretation 
and application of the provisions of the” relevant treaty.94 For the Chamber, 
this can reasonably be interpreted as meaning that the precautionary approach 
is a rule of custom, or more speciﬁcally, a “relevant rule[. . .] of international 
law” for the purposes of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.95 Whereas others have sought to argue that the judicial 
use of notions, such as the precautionary approach, can be justiﬁed by viewing 
them as an interstitial norm or as a ‘soft law’ general principle,96 the Chamber 
relies on a perhaps more traditional interpretation as to what the ICJ was seek-
ing to achieve in its judgment. Though ultimately this may prove to be the 
more radical interpretation, and undoubtedly it progresses the rather more 
nuanced comment made by the ICJ. Nevertheless, the Chamber ultimately 
leaves the ﬁnal promulgation of the customary status to another day, or at 
least to another judicial tribunal.
92 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 135.
93 Fitzmaurice, supra note 88, 4: “We should also be aware of the phenomenon . . . of the exis-
tence of a divergence between the traditional theory of international law based on consistent 
and uniform State practice and the norms ‘generally espoused as customary’, which defy clas-
sical tests of international customary law” quoting D. Bodansky, ‘Customary (and Not So 
Customary) International Environmental Law’ (1995) 3 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Stud-
ies 105.
94 Pulp Mills, paragraph 164.
95 Article 31(3)(c): “There shall be taken into account, together with the context: . . . (c) any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”.
96 See A. Boyle, ‘Soft Law in International Law-Making’ in Evans (ed.), supra note 79, 133: 
“If, alternatively, the precautionary principle is viewed as a general principle of law, on which 
decision-makers and courts may rely when deciding cases and interpreting treaties, then its 
subsequent use by national and international courts, and by international organizations, is 
easier to explain”. 
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Threshold of Risk
As to the matter of what the Chamber understands precaution to require, in 
many ways this is a much more interesting discussion. As noted above, the 
Regulations do not provide their own interpretation, but refer explicitly to 
the Rio Declaration. As the Chamber makes clear, Principle 15 is structured 
in two parts—a ﬁrst sentence, which “seems to refer in general terms” and 
a second sentence, which “limits its scope”,97 referring here to the qualiﬁca-
tions of “serious and irreversible”, “cost-eﬀective” and even “environmental 
degradation” (presumably in contrast to other forms of harm, including eco-
nomic). Moreover, as discussed later, the Chamber also discusses the notion 
of “capabilities” as found in that text. The express reference to, and seeming 
aﬃrmation, of the wording of Principle 15 by the Chamber is thus not sur-
prising in light of how it is introduced into the Regulations. What becomes 
rather more curious is the later interpretation of the precautionary approach 
in the context of the due diligence obligation. The Chamber makes the fol-
lowing statement:
This obligation [namely, of due diligence] applies in situations where scientiﬁc 
evidence concerning the scope and potential negative impact of the activity in 
question is insuﬃcient but where there are plausible indications of potential risks. 
A sponsoring State would not meet its obligations of due diligence if it disre-
garded those risks.98
The Chamber’s language here is notable. There is no reference to “threats of 
serious or irreversible damage”, rather it talks of “plausible indications of 
potential risks”. Is this a dilution of the requirements of Principle 15? It cer-
tainly reads as such. The notion of “plausible indications” is a signiﬁcantly 
lower threshold than most—if virtually all—other interpretations of the pre-
cautionary approach, other than perhaps those rare instances which have 
reversed the burden of proof.99 Did the Chamber intend to vary the precau-
tionary approach in this way? There is certainly no textual justiﬁcation in the 
97 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 128.
98 Ibid., paragraph 131. Emphasis added.
99 See, for instance, 1996 Protocol to the 1972 (London) Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (36 ILM (1997) 7), Article 3(1): 
“In implementing this Protocol, Contracting Parties shall apply a precautionary approach to 
environmental protection from dumping of wastes or other matter whereby appropriate pre-
ventative measures are taken when there is reason to believe that wastes or other matter intro-
duced into the marine environment are likely to cause harm even when there is no conclusive 
evidence to prove a causal relation between inputs and their eﬀects”.
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Regulations or judicial reasoning in the Advisory Opinion that would support 
a fundamental revision of the wording of Principle 15. It might be argued that 
the Chamber was making a distinction between how the precautionary 
approach applies within the context of the due diligence obligation as com-
pared to the precautionary approach as an autonomous obligation. In terms 
of how the Advisory Opinion is structured, this might make some sense. Later 
on, when discussing how the discrete requirement of “best environmental 
practices” becomes part of the due diligence obligation, the Chamber does say 
it does so only in “general terms”, thus it might be argued that the Chamber 
is making a similar distinction here. The argument is namely that the precau-
tionary approach loses some of its prescriptiveness and legal rigour when 
applied within the more general context of the due diligence obligation. Cer-
tainly, the Chamber goes on to quote ITLOS’s 1999 Order in the Southern 
Blueﬁn Tuna cases, where the precautionary approach is translated into the 
more amorphous requirement of “prudence and caution”.100 But can such an 
argument stand up to scrutiny? Does the precautionary approach—as an 
autonomous obligation—occupy a discrete sphere of inﬂuence which would 
permit such a demarcation from its application within the due diligence con-
text? The precautionary approach is best viewed as a horizontal obligation that 
exists alongside other commitments, and whilst it makes sense that even where 
the stringent conditions for the application of the precautionary approach are 
not met, environmental prerogatives still demand the highest level of environ-
mental protection feasible (what ITLOS was seeking to achieve by referring to 
“prudence and caution”), the Chamber does not seem to be referring here to 
such a ‘sub-optimal’ use of the precautionary approach. Indeed, the Chamber 
very clearly says: “the precautionary approach is also an integral part of the 
general obligation of due diligence”, and thus in no way seems to be seeking 
to demarcate a diﬀerent, or lower, ‘form’ of precaution.
An alternative understanding might be that the overall application of the 
precautionary approach within the Area as a particularly sensitive environ-
ment101—either as an autonomous obligation or as part of due diligence—
100 Order of 27 August 1999 (Southern Blueﬁn Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v 
Japan)) paragraph 77; http://www.itlos.org/ﬁleadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_3_4/
Order.27.08.99.E.pdf (last accessed: August 2011)). Cf. Fitzmaurice, supra note 88, 66, who 
sees a “trend in environmental management which is characterized by a more practical 
approach . . . adopting more humble but at the same time more realistic goals . . . Therefore, 
‘prudence and caution’ are recommended”.
101 The scale of the environmental impact of exploring and exploiting mineral resources on the 
Area remains unclear. As the then Secretary-General of the Authority, Satya Nandan, said in a 
preface to a 1999 report on a 1998 workshop organised by the Authority on the development 
of environmental guidelines: “While it is recognized that there is little or no impact in the 
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demands a more stringent interpretation and consequent lower threshold of 
risk. The Chamber noted that the obligation of due diligence varies in the 
light of the sensitivity of the environment in which States must act, or are 
required to regulate for. Thus, similarly, it might be argued that the precau-
tionary approach must vary in light of the environmental context, with the 
consequence that the Area demands a particularly low threshold before risk is 
assessed and managed. But if this were true, why do the Regulations simply 
refer to Principle 15 and not expand upon this in much greater detail? More-
over, the standard contractual clause in the Sulphides Regulation refers to the 
fact that the precautionary approach is to be applied “as far as reasonably pos-
sible” by a contractor.102 This is not a strong version of the precautionary 
approach in general and certainly not if one were to seek to apply an even 
more stringent version of the precautionary approach. It is thus diﬃcult to 
argue that the Chamber intended to impose a more stringent duty of precau-
tion on sponsoring States in the Area.
Nevertheless, unless one is to consider these words to be without legal sig-
niﬁcance, one should not discount them entirely. At best, they are an unfor-
tunate attempt to say the same thing in a diﬀerent way; at worst, they confuse 
the debate. In particular, it dilutes the Chamber’s ﬁnding of customary status 
for the precautionary approach—for it inevitably raises the matter as to what 
is being found to be a rule of custom. The Chamber risks being accused of 
inconsistent judicial activism, which would be unfortunate in light of the 
overall strengths of the Advisory Opinion. Of course, if the Chamber did 
early stages of polymetallic nodule exploration, it is nevertheless possible to begin at an early 
stage to collect basic environmental information (baseline data) to conﬁrm this hypothesis, 
and to provide more precise information on possible impacts, as progress is made during the 
test mining phase of an exploration plan”; http://www.isa.org.jm/ﬁles/documents/EN/
Pubs/1998Proceedings.pdf (last accessed: July 2011). See the Note of 26 August 2010 from 
the Authority’s Legal Counsel to the Chamber on the likely impact of exploration and mining 
activities for nodules on the marine environment, relying on work from the Authority’s 2001 
Harmonisation Workshop on the Standardization of Environmental Data and Information: 
Development and Guidelines; http://www.itlos.org/ﬁleadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_
no_17/ISA_1.pdf (last accessed: July 2011). See also the Submission by Greenpeace and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (13 August 2010); http://www.itlos.org/ﬁleadmin/itlos/
documents/cases/case_no_17/Statement_Greenpeace_WWF.pdf (last accessed: July 2011): 
“Exploitation of the resources of the deep seabed is a high-risk activity because of the diﬃculty 
of working at great depths and because so much remains unknown about this region. The deep 
seabed harbors unusual and diverse ecosystems which are of great interest to science, and 
whose genetic resources may have medical or other applications. Hydrothermal vents, which 
are seen as likely areas for mining, play host to a particularly rich diversity of species, with a 
high degree of endemism”.
102 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 133.
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indeed intend for these words of “plausible indications of potential risks” 
to have normative impact, then—as with any judicial decision—its signiﬁ-
cance lies not in the mere pronouncement by a judicial body but by the per-
suasiveness of its reasoning. Without such reasoning, the Chamber has merely 
added an unfortunate layer to what is a generally positive contribution to the 
wider debate.
Best Environmental Practices
Finally, it is worth noting that the Chamber views the obligation of applying 
“best environmental practices” as synergistic with the precautionary approach, 
although the Chamber equally recognises that it is also “in general terms” an 
element of the broader due diligence obligation, and thus like the precaution-
ary approach is applicable across the broad scope of activities within the Area. 
It is signiﬁcant that the Chamber comes to this view despite the fact that, 
unlike the precautionary approach which is featured in both the Nodules and 
Sulphides Regulations, the obligation of applying/requiring best environmen-
tal practices only appears in the later Sulphides Regulations. Nevertheless, 
“[t]he adoption of higher standards in the more recent Sulphides Regula-
tions would seem to indicate that in the light of the advancement in scientiﬁc 
knowledge, member States of the Authority have become convinced of the 
need for sponsoring States to apply “best environmental practices” in general 
terms”.103 More speciﬁcally, the Chamber goes on to say that because of this, 
and absent any textual reason that may be found, “it may be found that the 
Nodules Regulations should be interpreted in light of the development of the 
law, as evidenced by the subsequent adoption of the Sulphides Regulations”.104 
As with the transfer of the precautionary approach from the Regulations to 
103 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 136. As an element of due diligence, this would seem to indi-
cate that best environmental practices are required under customary international law as part 
of a State’s responsibility to weigh up various factors in assessing how to regulate activities that 
may cause transboundary and global harm. As with precaution, what the ICJ implies in Pulp 
Mills (“rules and measures adopted by the parties both have to conform to applicable interna-
tional agreements and to take account of internationally agreed technical standards” (para-
graph 197)) is made more explicit in the Advisory Opinion. However, in Pulp Mills, a close 
reading of the judgment on the matter of how far the parties must keep up with changing 
international standards fails to reveal whether the obligation in that case ﬂows from the cus-
tomary obligation of due diligence or the treaty requirement that “measures must be ‘in accor-
dance with applicable international agreements’ and ‘in keeping, where relevant, with the 
guidelines and recommendations of international technical bodies’” (ibid.). Although a strong 
case can be made for the former interpretation, textually it would seem to be the latter inter-
pretation which is more defensible.
104 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 137.
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the overall regime, the Chamber also ﬁnds the inclusion of best environmental 
practices within the later Sulphides Regulations as being suﬃcient not only to 
justify its inclusion within the due diligence obligation but also as an interpre-
tative guide to the earlier Nodules Regulations. Similarly, the Chamber ﬁnds 
that the absence of the precautionary approach in the standard clauses in the 
Nodules Regulations (but its existence in the Sulphides Regulations) is suﬃ-
cient to require “the sponsoring State to take measures within the framework 
of its own legal system in order to oblige sponsored entities to adopt such an 
approach”.105 The intention of the Parties at the time of the negotiation of the 
earlier instruments is now giving way to, or being subsumed within, a more 
evolutionary interpretation,106 despite the fact that these instruments are only 
a single decade (in the case of the two sets of Regulations) apart.107 As should 
be gleaned from the general tone of this article, the judgment is warmly 
received by this author, but nevertheless, even he wishes to stop and reﬂect 
on some of these arguably more creative—radical seems too strong—aspects 
of treaty and instrument interpretation, which are utilised by the Chamber 
to ensure maximum coherence and contemporaneity in its application 
and reach.
Common but Diﬀerentiated Responsibilities
It was Nauru’s concerns as a developing State that initially prompted the call 
for an advisory opinion. The prospect of it being ﬁnancial liable for damage 
caused by an entity that it sponsors raised the spectre for Nauru of “losing 
more than it actually has”. Though this seems slightly exaggerated, there is 
nevertheless truth in the argument, because of the sensitivity of the environ-
ment of the Area, as well as the surrounding high seas, and the consequent 
level of damage that could be done as a result. Thus, by raising issues as to 
when responsibility may arise and what the level of any liability might be, 
Nauru’s questions are of general importance. In asking these questions, Nauru 
105 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 134.
106 See Iron Rhine Railway, paragraph 80: “it seems that an evolutive interpretation, which 
would ensure an application of the treaty that would be eﬀective in terms of its object and 
purpose, will be preferred to a strict application of the intertemporal rule”. However, note 
Judge Bedjaoui in his separate opinion in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, ICJ Reports (1997) 7, 122: 
“the essential basis for the interpretation of a treaty remains the ‘ﬁxed reference’ to contempo-
rary international law at the time of its conclusion. The ‘mobile reference’ to the law which will 
subsequently have developed can be recommended only in exceptional cases”.
107 Indeed, the Advisory Opinion may provide a certain impetus for the States Parties to 
review the Nodules Regulations in light of more recent developments.
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was hoping, of course, for a legal view that the obligations of developing States 
were measurably diﬀerent from those of developed States.
The Chamber was thus faced with the complex question of how far devel-
oping States that sponsored entities were subject to preferential rules. On ﬁrst 
appearances, the question would appear to be highly nuanced, as the regime 
contains numerous provisions which do take into account the interests of 
developing States. In particular, the LOSC states that “[t]he eﬀective partici-
pation of developing States in activities in the Area shall be promoted . . . hav-
ing due regard to their special interests and needs”,108 going on to reference 
speciﬁcally land-locked and geographically disadvantaged developing States. 
The Chamber thus rightly acknowledges those provisions of the Convention 
(as aﬀected by the 1994 Implementation Agreement) that do take such con-
siderations into account. Nevertheless, the Chamber focuses on the speciﬁc 
wording of Article 148 which states that such eﬀective participation “shall be 
promoted as speciﬁcally provided for in this Part”,109 thus demarcating those 
provisions for which no speciﬁc mention is made in terms of the level of devel-
opment. As the Chamber remarks, “there is no general clause for the consid-
eration of such interests and needs beyond what is provided for”.110 Moreover, 
there is no discussion of common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities, either as 
an element of global environmental policy, never mind as an emerging auton-
omous legal principle. This would seem to reﬂect the general perception as to 
the inherently political nature of Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which 
endorsed the notion of common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities;111 while 
the principle has found reﬂection in treaty law, it remains notably absent from 
judicial discussion,112 notwithstanding the endorsement and utility of sustain-
able development as a motif more generally by courts and tribunals.
108 Article 148 LOSC.
109 Emphasis added.
110 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 156.
111 Principle 7 Rio Declaration: “States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to 
conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the 
diﬀerent contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but diﬀer-
entiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they 
bear in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their 
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and ﬁnancial resources they 
command”. For comment, see Y. Matsui, “The Principle of ‘Common but Diﬀerentiated 
Responsibilities’” in: N. Schrijver and F. Weiss (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Devel-
opment: Principles and Practice (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoﬀ, 2004) 73–96.
112 This is not to dispute that the principle of common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities, as 
well as reference to the special needs and interests of developing countries (Principle 6 Rio 
Declaration), has had signiﬁcant impact on the development of multilateral treaty regimes, 
both at their initial adoption and subsequently as they are further reﬁned and implemented. 
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Uniformity of Standards
Nevertheless, the Chamber felt required to identify not just the limits of pref-
erential treatment within the regime, but also why diﬀerentiation beyond 
this—in the case of sponsoring developing States—would be inappropriate. 
Though dressed in legal language, the Chamber’s position on this is equally 
determined by considerations of policy in seeking to establish clear parameters 
for a regime in many ways at the beginning of its operational existence. Nota-
bly, the language of the high seas—and some of the diﬃculties that have faced 
that particular maritime zone—are picked and used as a counterpoint to 
indicate a level of legality and order that some feel is often missing on the 
high seas.
Equality of treatment between developing and developed sponsoring States is 
consistent with the need to prevent commercial enterprises based in developed 
States from setting up companies in developing States, acquiring their nationality 
and obtaining their sponsorship in the hope of being subjected to less burden-
some regulations and controls. The spread of sponsoring States ‘of convenience’ 
would jeopardize uniform application of the highest standards of protection of 
the marine environment, the safe development of activities in the Area and pro-
tection of the common heritage of mankind.113 
Whether the diﬃculties of regulating ships ﬂying ﬂags of convenience on the 
high seas is directly analogous to sponsored entities seeking out States ‘of conve-
nience’ is disputable—though the point that diﬀerentiation in standards would 
undermine overall regulatory uniformity must nevertheless be accurate.
However, the Chamber recognises that diﬀerentiation may be possible if 
enacted within the Authority’s express rules imposed upon sponsoring States114 
and gives the example of the incorporation of the precautionary approach 
(Principle 15 Rio Declaration) in the Nodules and Sulphides Regulations. 
Relying on the wording of Principle 15 which speaks of States applying a 
precautionary approach “according to their capabilities”, the Chamber notes 
However, many consider the principle to be inherently political in nature and thus beyond the 
purview of judicial decision-making. As a ‘soft law’ principle, subject to variable political 
claims, it has so far proved diﬃcult to strengthen the normative quality of the principle. Nev-
ertheless, even where it has been found advisable for reasons of environmental protection not 
to support increased diﬀerentiation in terms of commitments, it is arguable that  judicial bod-
ies should always seek to at least acknowledge the broader reality of socio-economic diﬀerences 
between States—the Advisory Opinion arguably does do this, on which see below.
113 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 159.
114 Ibid., paragraph 160.
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that it “follows that the requirements for complying with the obligation to 
apply the precautionary approach may be stricter for the developed than for 
the developing sponsoring States”.115 But the Chamber is clearly concerned 
not to leave the door too far ajar, noting immediately afterwards that the 
requirement to use best environmental practices in the Sulphides Regulations 
is equally not so qualiﬁed.
Moreover, and perhaps of greater interest, is the Chamber’s determination 
not to categorise developed and developing States too sharply. Not all within 
the same “group” should be considered in the same light; so as regards the 
precautionary approach, “the reference to “capabilities” is only a broad and 
imprecise reference to the diﬀerences in developed and developing States”.116 
The Chamber goes on to add: “What counts in a speciﬁc situation is the level 
of scientiﬁc knowledge and technical capability available to a given State in 
the relevant scientiﬁc and technical ﬁelds”.117 This is a wonderfully conceived 
sentence. It reads as liberation for individual States; each is assessed against its 
own level of development at any particular time. It is refreshingly individual-
istic against the usual backdrop of over-generalisation sometimes to be found 
in international environmental law. But the constraint for States is equally 
obvious; individual States can no longer hide behind generalities and assump-
tions; being a developing State is itself not enough to justify a particular stance. 
Of course, in reality, what the Chamber proposes here is very diﬃcult to 
implement and operationalise, not only in everyday situations but also by 
judicial tribunals called to make an assessment. Moreover, the Chamber’s 
comments are not restricted here to activities in the Area, and thus it has gen-
eral resonance for the application and use of the precautionary approach, and 
has the potential to be used in the future to set a higher level of scrutiny before 
a developing State is able to say that its level of development prevented it from 
acting in anticipation of scientiﬁc certainty.
Curiously, in this discussion on capabilities and diﬀerentiation, there is 
no mention of how due diligence must invariably be aﬀected by a State’s 
level of development. Indeed, the Chamber would seem to be somewhat reti-
cent on this point, after highlighting that there was no such qualiﬁcation as 
regards the use of best environmental practices, which is viewed as part of the 
due diligence requirement. Moreover, in the Chamber’s earlier discussion of 
due diligence, although there is a mention of how the content of this obliga-
tion may change in light of a range of factors, these factors do not include a 
country’s capacity to implement and enforce such rules in light of its level of 
115 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 161.
116 Ibid., paragraph 162. 
117 Ibid.
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development. This would suggest—both explicitly by what it says about best 
environmental practices and implicitly by what it does not say about due 
diligence—that the Chamber does not consider development level to be a rel-
evant consideration. This is in contrast not only to what it says itself about the 
precautionary approach but also to the commentary to the ILC 2001 Articles 
on Transboundary Harm which does very clearly state that “[t]he economic 
level of States is one of the factors to be taken into account in determining 
whether a State has complied with its obligation of due diligence. But a State’s 
economic level cannot be used to dispense the State from its obligation”.118 
This would seem to be a much more balanced approach than to ignore the 
issue altogether as the Chamber seems to have done.
Liability and Responsibility
Although the Chamber was not prepared to endorse a liberal approach to 
preferential treatment for developing States, it does at another point of the 
Advisory Opinion go some way to assuaging the initial concern of Naura as a 
developing State and, at the same time, raise interesting issues of general inter-
national law as regards the potential extent of a sponsoring State’s liability. It 
is important that the Chamber rightly distinguishes between the contractor’s 
liability and the sponsoring State’s liability. Historically, as both ﬂow from the 
same damage, there may be some confusion not only as to when each is liable, 
and for what, but also the relationship between these liabilities. The responsi-
bility of the State to make reparation is a matter of international law whereas 
the liability of a private entity is an issue of domestic law, as aﬀected by neces-
sary conﬂict of laws or harmonisation rules.119 This distinction between State 
and private liability is not necessarily altogether diﬀerent in relation to the 
Area, though the link between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ is more 
closely inter-related by means of the contract that any sponsored entity signs 
with the Authority and the legal requirement that a sponsoring State must 
ensure respect for such commitments in its domestic law. Thus, the Chamber 
is perhaps more appropriately situated than many international tribunals to 
comment upon the relationship between these liabilities. Arguably, because of 
this, the Chamber makes a number of points, both of particular and indeed 
arguably of wider relevance.
118 2001 Articles on Transboundary Harm, commentary to Article 3 (ILC, supra note 45, 
155).
119 See A. Boyle, (2005) ‘Globalising Environmental Liability: the Interplay of National and 
International Law’ 17 Journal of Environmental Law 3.
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First, a sponsoring State’s liability arises from a breach of its own responsi-
bilities of due diligence (or of a direct obligation), and not from a breach of 
the contractor’s. As Freestone notes, this will disappoint those who were wish-
ing the Chamber would ﬁnd a system of strict liability but the wording of the 
Convention was itself against this.120 Second, the Chamber recognises that the 
contractor’s liability is for the “actual amount of the damage”,121 although 
the form reparation would take “will depend on both the actual damage and 
the technical feasibility of restoring the situation”.122 Third, and importantly 
for developing States such as Nauru:
the liability of the sponsoring State depends upon the damage resulting from the 
activities or omissions of the sponsored contractor. But . . . this is merely a trigger 
mechanism. Such damage is not, however, automatically attributable to the 
sponsoring State.123
In other words, whilst the damage that occurs may give rise to liability for 
both contractor and State, this will not immediately result in liability for the 
sponsoring State. This is a fundamental ﬁnding by the Chamber and pivotal 
to the Advisory Opinion. First, if the contractor (which causes the damage) 
compensates to the full amount required “there is no room for reparation” by 
the State.124 Second, and signiﬁcantly—and perhaps less certain in terms of 
what the Chamber would say on this point—was whether residual liability 
rested with the State where either the contractor was not able to pay to the full 
extent (but where the State had met its due diligence obligations) or where the 
sponsoring State had breached its due diligence commitments but that this 
could not be causally linked to the damage. As the Chamber notes, diﬀerent 
parties before it took diametrically opposite positions on this question.
However, the Chamber was very certain, and arguably it is one of the clear-
est passages in the Advisory Opinion. It notes that whilst contractor and State 
liabilities exist “in parallel”, there is no scope for residual liability. Based on a 
very classical understanding of the nature of the due diligence obligation, the 
Chamber remarks: “[t]he liability of the sponsoring State arises from its own 
failure to comply with its responsibilities under the Convention and related 
instruments”.125 Therefore, whilst “the liability of the sponsoring State depends 
120 Freestone, supra note 2.
121 LOSC Annex III, Article 22 .
122 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 197.
123 Ibid., paragraph 201.
124 Ibid., paragraph 202.
125 Ibid., paragraph 204.
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on the occurrence of damage resulting from the failure of the sponsored 
contractor . . . this does not make the sponsoring State responsible for the dam-
age caused”.126 If on the other hand, the State has breached its due diligence 
obligations and there is a causal link to the damage (and the contractor itself 
cannot or does not compensate), the requirement to make full reparation for 
the “actual amount of the damage” is the same on the State as it is on the 
sponsored contractor.
Recognising that by not imposing a regime of residual liability, it opens up 
the possibility for instances of uncompensated damage, the Chamber refers 
back to the text of the Convention and suggests that the Authority may wish 
to consider whether to establish a “trust fund to compensate for the damage 
not covered”.127 This seems particularly important as the Chamber takes note 
of the failed eﬀorts on the part of the International Law Commission to 
address the issue of compensation for damage resulting from acts not prohib-
ited under international law.128 Thus, without clearer guidelines in interna-
tional law on “State liability for lawful acts”,129 the Chamber is left to both 
remind the Authority of the potential desirability of a trust fund and, more 
speciﬁcally, that LOSC Article 304 allows for further development of rules of 
international law in relation to responsibility and liability.
In conclusion, on the issue of developing States and the Area, might it 
be considered that what the Chamber takes with one hand (namely, that 
preferential treatment is limited to that expressly provided for), it gives with 
another (namely, the Chamber’s comments on liability)? Perhaps. Certainly 
the Chamber’s decision that there is no scope for residual liability will be wel-
comed by potential sponsoring States,130 and not just developing countries. 
Moreover, though the analogy is somewhat strained, the possibility of the 
emergence of States of convenience cannot be discounted. Thus, the common 
heritage status of the Area both provides expression to, but also a justiﬁca-
tion for constraining, the interests—real or perceived—of developing State 
Parties. As to whether more could have been made of the notion of common 
126 Ibid.
127 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 205. The Chamber was referring to Article 235(3) LOSC, 
which states that “where appropriate, development of criteria and procedures for payment of 
adequate compensation, such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds”.
128 For general analysis, see A. Boyle, ‘State Responsibility and International Liability for Inju-
rious Consequences Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction’ (1990) 39 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
129 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 209.
130 Indeed, this is arguably shown by the resubmission of the applications to the Authority by 
Nauru and Tonga (see note 10).
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but diﬀerentiated responsibilities in this context, the Chamber was arguably 
right not to stray beyond the text of the LOSC to ﬁnd a general justiﬁcation 
for diﬀerentiation, as this would be a Pandora’s box and create as many prob-
lems as it would appear to solve. If there is criticism of the Advisory Opinion 
here, it is the unanswered question about due diligence—as a question of fact, 
dependent on a range of variables, should not the level of development be one 
of them? If the Chamber is of the view that it should not, it has unfortunately 
created a paradox through how it understood the contextual nature of the 
application of the precautionary approach in this situation.
The Principle of Good Governance
The ﬁnal matter to consider is what the Chamber believed sponsoring States 
are required to accomplish domestically to meet their international obligations 
in terms of their due diligence obligation. If somewhat artiﬁcially, though not 
completely without reason, these ﬁnal issues are grouped around the principle 
of good governance.131 The ﬁrst point to make is that the Chamber sought to 
address whether a sponsoring State could achieve its obligation to regulate 
sponsored contractors purely through the means of private law and contrac-
tual relations. While there may be aspects of a sponsored entity’s behaviour 
that could be governed by administrative measures or even contract, the 
Chamber was equally clear that there were numerous other aspects of its obli-
gations that could not. As the Chamber notes, Article 4, paragraph 4 of LOSC 
Annex III speciﬁes quite clearly the obligation to adopt binding laws and 
regulations in this instance. Indeed, the Chamber is of the view that to do 
otherwise would be incompatible with the Convention “in general”—which 
might be taken to refer to the object and purpose of the LOSC—and the 
governance of the Area, in particular. This is perhaps not too surprising, or 
unexpected. An international convention premised on the rule of law in 
marine aﬀairs might easily be read as preferring (though not always requiring) 
States to implement their obligations through legally binding norms.
131 New Delhi Declaration, paragraph 6.1: “The principle of good governance is essential to 
the progressive development and codiﬁcation of international law relating to sustainable devel-
opment. It commits States and international organizations: (a) to adopt democratic and trans-
parent decision-making procedures and ﬁnancial accountability; . . . (c) to respect the principle 
of due process in their procedures and to observe the rule of law”.
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Scepticism of “Contractual Approach” to Regulation
The Chamber could have limited its discussion on this matter to positive law. 
What is perhaps more surprising is where the Chamber goes next with its 
Advisory Opinion, ﬁrst noting the good governance justiﬁcations for the 
enactment of law, over and above mere contracts, and then outlining (within 
the conﬁnes of its judicial role) some of the general principles that should 
guide the content of the law and regulations. Thus, the Chamber manages to 
preserve its judicial independence whilst setting outer parameters for what it 
considered to be acceptable. Reading the Advisory Opinion as a whole, it 
might be concluded this is the only part of the judgment which strays far into 
general obiter, though the remarks made—as will be seen—are nevertheless 
sensible for all that.
In terms of the ﬁrst issue,—that of compliance through contract—the 
Chamber relies heavily on the need for accountability and public availability 
of relevant documents. As it says, “[t]he ‘contract approach’ would, moreover, 
lack transparency. It will be diﬃcult to verify, through publicly available mea-
sures, that the sponsoring State had met its obligations”.132 In particular, rec-
ognising that neither the Convention nor either set of Regulations require 
sponsorship agreements between State and sponsored entity to be submitted 
either to the Authority or released publicly (if indeed such an agreement has 
been made), the Chamber is clearly anxious to avoid the capacity of either 
party to escape their obligations. Moreover, though such a lack of information 
is inevitably based on commercial conﬁdentiality, the Chamber is equally 
convinced as to the sponsoring State’s particular obligation for the good gov-
ernance of the Area—the Chamber noting again the commitment in LOSC 
Article 153 that the sponsoring State is under a direct obligation to assist the 
Authority. Moreover, the Chamber makes clear that in relation to the other 
principal private transaction—the exploration contract between the spon-
sored entity and the Authority, to which the sponsoring State is not a party—
the sponsoring State is equally under an obligation to adopt binding rules that 
not only do not hinder the fulﬁlment of the contract but “rather assist the 
contractor in that respect”.133
Hallmarks of Regulation: Reasonableness and Non-Arbitrariness
On the question of the content of such binding rules, the Chamber also 
gives some direction to sponsoring States as to the content of the measures 
132 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 225.
133 Ibid., paragraph 238.
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which would “enable it to discharge its responsibilities”.134 The Chamber is 
keen to stress it will not interfere in legitimate areas of State discretion; “[p]
olicy choices on such matters must be made by the sponsoring State”—to do 
otherwise would run the risk of the Chamber as a “[j]udicial bod[y] [to] per-
form functions that are not in keeping with . . . [its] judicial character”.135 How-
ever, this does not prevent the Chamber from making comments of certain 
“general considerations that a sponsoring State may ﬁnd useful”.136 The term 
“useful” here is interesting; purposely not prescriptive, nevertheless it is not as 
anodyne as a literal ﬁrst reading might suggest. Indeed, though the Chamber 
recognises that measures will vary between sponsoring States, often dependent 
on the nature of the “framework of its legal system”, State discretion is not 
absolute. Above all, such measures must be “reasonably appropriate”.137 The 
Chamber’s comments on this issue may be divided into four. First, it gives spe-
ciﬁc examples of the type of rules that a sponsoring State may wish to include.138 
Second, it refers to examples of existing domestic law as evidence of good prac-
tice.139 Third, it acknowledges that domestic law is permitted to require higher 
environmental standards than the “minimum standard of stringency” imposed 
by the Convention and Regulations.140 Finally, fourth—though for complete-
ness, it should be pointed out that the Chamber places this ﬁrst—it sets out 
what it terms “some general considerations”, which are worth quoting in full.
134 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 227.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Annex III, Article 4, paragraph 4 LOSC: “A sponsoring State shall not, however, be liable 
for damage caused by any failure of a contractor sponsored by it to comply with its obligations 
if that State Party has adopted laws and regulations and taken administrative measures which 
are, within the framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for securing compliance 
by persons under its jurisdiction”.
138 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 234: “These provisions may concern, inter alia, ﬁnancial via-
bility and technical capacity of sponsored contractors, conditions for issuing a certiﬁcate of 
sponsorship and penalties for non-compliance by such contractors”.
139 Namely, “the Deep Seabed Mining Law adopted by Germany and of similar legislation 
adopted by the Czech Republic” (Advisory Opinion, paragraph 237). Press Release (14 July 
2011): Seabed Council discusses Recent Advisory Opinion (http://www.isa.org.jm/ﬁles/docu-
ments/EN/Press/Press11/SB-17-5.pdf (last accessed: July 2011)): “Several delegations, includ-
ing Australia, Bangladesh and Brazil supported Mexico’s call for “model laws” to be developed 
by the Authority . . . [The representative from Germany] said that his country would be using 
the advisory opinion as a starting point for a review of its legislation relating to the provision 
of recourse and compensation arising from seabed activities. The Netherlands representative 
suggested that in developing model legislation, the Authority could seek guidance from States 
Parties which already had such legislation in place”.
140 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 240.
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. . . the sponsoring State must take into account, objectively, the relevant options 
in a manner that is reasonable, relevant and conducive to the beneﬁt of mankind 
as a whole. It must act in good faith, especially when its action is likely to aﬀect 
prejudicially the interests of mankind as a whole . . . Reasonableness and non-
arbitrariness must remain the hallmarks of any action taken by the sponsoring 
State.141
This seems very sensible in tone, if slightly abstract in nature. Undoubtedly, 
the special nature of the Area as common heritage of mankind has signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuenced the Chamber in this regard. Thus, it might be thought that 
it has little general relevance to the due diligence obligation, for instance, of 
States in regulating transboundary hazards. Nevertheless, one can see simi-
larities with the dicta of the ICJ in Pulp Mills in which it talked of due dili-
gence being “an obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate 
rules and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement”.142 
Thus to the extent that the Chamber’s references to reasonableness, non-arbi-
trariness and good faith have generic relevance, this aspect of the Advisory 
Opinion can be seen to have broader appeal. Moreover, although “ordinary” 
transboundary pollution will rarely harm special areas, such as the common 
heritage, the overarching notion that due diligence regulation within a State 
must be assessed on how reasonable it is in light of all the circumstances and 
consultation between itself and potentially aﬀected States are undertaken on 
the basis of good faith would both seem to be non-contentious. To that extent, 
the Chamber has again contributed to the general jurisprudence on the due 
diligence requirement under customary international law.
Conclusion
It has been remarked that the Advisory Opinion has signiﬁcance beyond 
the mere elucidation of the rights and responsibilities of sponsoring States 
in the Area.143 Freestone has commented that “[f ]rom an international 
141 Ibid., paragraph 230.
142 Pulp Mills, paragraph 197.
143 This is not to negate the primary importance of the Advisory Opinion as legal guidance to 
the Authority: “‘The advisory opinion on responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring 
activities in the Area rendered by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the sea has proved to be a milestone in the life of Seabed Authority and the Law 
of the Sea,’ the Authority’s Secretary-General said this morning . . . ‘The universal reaction to 
the opinion, including from academia, members of the Authority and the seabed mining 
industry, had been positive, in that it had provided much-needed and long-expected certainty 
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 environmental law point of view, this is also a historic ruling”.144 I would agree 
and for me, the reasons for this would be ﬁve-fold. First is the aﬃrmation and 
extension by the Chamber of the ICJ’s understanding of due diligence, EIA 
and the precautionary approach. As noted above, although one must be care-
ful not to strain too far the nuances and peculiarities of the regime put in place 
to govern the Area, nevertheless the Advisory Opinion raises a number of 
points of general signiﬁcance, which will undoubtedly inﬂuence both future 
judicial decisions and policy discourses.
Second, as a subset of the due diligence discussion, the Chamber’s com-
ments on the importance of putting in place binding law to constrain private 
activity also raises a general issue of law, of particular interest as the depen-
dency of States on private actors—both in the environmental sphere and 
elsewhere—is only likely to continue to grow in the years ahead. Thus, as a 
broad statement of principle, the Chamber’s comments on the value of trans-
parency, and by implication, legitimacy of regulations over contractual com-
pliance is surely a sound approach in many other situations.
Third, the Chamber’s discussion on the possibility of diﬀerentiation between 
diﬀerent types of States Parties seems to me to be especially timely. Much has 
been said about common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities in recent years, 
especially within the context of the climate change regime. Debate has often 
focused on broad distinctions between developed and developing States and, 
within the context of the climate change regime in particular, how the “BRIC” 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries are forcing changes in assumptions 
about these broad characterisations. The debate has been highly political and 
politicised. In a very diﬀerent factual context, the Chamber’s discussion of the 
issue highlights two fundamental points. First, although the existence of dif-
ferentiation (insofar as it exists) within Part XI was invariably the result of 
State interests within the negotiations and thus reﬂects political compromise, 
equally such diﬀerentiation is capable of being understood normatively and 
can consequently be both legitimised and constrained through judicial inter-
pretation. In this case, for instance, this is achieved by not permitting the level 
of development to be used to compromise the environmental integrity of the 
in the interpretation of the obligations and responsibilities of sponsoring States under the 
Convention and the Agreement. It was an encouraging sign for the Authority and its mem-
bers, not least because it suggested that the commercial sector was developing conﬁdence in 
the legal regime for the orderly development of the resources of the Area that had been put in 
place over the past 13 years,’ he added” (Press Release (14 July 2011), supra note 139).
144 Freestone, supra note 2.
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regime through the creation of sponsoring States “of convenience”. Second, 
and related to this, is the Chamber’s comment—very much obiter, but 
 nonetheless important in recognition of the argument that diﬀerentiation is a 
generic tool in need of more precise reﬁnement—that “[w]hat counts in a 
speciﬁc situation is the level of scientiﬁc knowledge and technical capability 
available to a given State”.
Fourth, the Advisory Opinion is notable in its treatment of the legal impli-
cations of common heritage of mankind. Although, as one would expect 
where the questions asked are speciﬁc and technical, there is no great oppor-
tunity for declaratory pronouncements on the status or importance of the 
ideal of common heritage, nevertheless the Chamber does utilise the principle 
at many points to inform its reasoning and to strength the obligations of 
sponsoring States. When discussing the rights of developing States within the 
Area, the idea of equity which underlies the principle is clearly noted, and 
similarly when highlighting the role of sponsoring States in supporting the 
Authority in the conduct of its aﬀairs, it too is formulated very directly on the 
basis of the Authority’s principal function in ensuring the “proper implemen-
tation of the principle”. Moreover, the common heritage of mankind was the 
keystone on which the Chamber found the Authority to have the legal right 
to bring a claim of damages under international law: “such entitlement is 
implicit in . . . the Authority . . . act[ing] “on behalf ” of mankind”. Common 
heritage may have become a rather historic and iconic idea in international 
politics—indeed, a little like deep seabed mining itself—but the Chamber has 
done much to present it as very much an active principle of international law, 
as well as being a fundamental, if a discrete, element of the promotion of 
global sustainable development.
Finally, ﬁfth, it is essential to recognise the Chamber’s contribution to gen-
eral international law and the impact this may have on international environ-
mental law, international law on sustainable development and speciﬁcally the 
protection of the global commons. In this regard, the Chamber’s positive 
assertion of the existence of a procedural right to enforce erga omnes obliga-
tions is a very good example; it is signiﬁcant not only for the Area, and poten-
tially for international environmental law but also for the long-term evolution 
of the international legal order. Perhaps that is the Chamber’s greatest achieve-
ment; without in any way stretching its mandate or the applicable law beyond 
what either could bear—though admittedly sometimes acting quite cre-
atively—the Chamber has integrated governance of the Area into the main-
stream of international law of the sea, international law on sustainable 
development and general international law. Concurrently, the Chamber has 
also strengthened the LOSC, international environmental law and general 
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international law through its clariﬁcation of the rights and responsibilities in 
the Area. For an Advisory Opinion “given as a matter of urgency”—as required 
by the LOSC—the judgment can rightly be viewed as an impressive contribu-
tion to international jurisprudence, and certainly should not be marginalised 
as being relevant only to the Area.
